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The impact of an inpatient electronic prescribing system on prescribing error 
causation: a qualitative evaluation in an English hospital 
ABSTRACT 
Introduction 
Few studies have applied a systems approach to understanding the causes of specific 
prescribing errors in the context of hospital electronic prescribing (EP). A comprehensive 
understanding of underlying causes is essential for developing effective interventions to 
improve prescribing safety. Our objectives were to explore prescribers’ perspectives of the 
causes of errors occurring with EP and to make recommendations to maximise benefits and 
minimise risks.   
Methods 
We studied a large hospital using inpatient EP. From April to June 2016, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with purposively sampled prescribers involved with a prescribing 
error. Interviews explored prescribers’ perceived causes of the error and views about EP, 
and were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Data were thematically analysed against 
a framework based on Reason’s accident causation model, with a focus on identifying latent 
conditions.  
Results 
Twenty-five interviews explored causes of thirty-two errors. Slips and rule-based mistakes 
were the most common active failures. Error causation was multifactorial; environmental, 
individual, team, task and technology error-producing conditions were all influenced by EP. 
There were three broad groups of latent conditions: the EP system’s functionality and 
design; the organisation’s decisions around EP implementation and use; and prescribing 
behaviours in the context of EP. 
Conclusions 
Errors were associated with the design of EP itself and its integration within the healthcare 
environment. Findings suggest that EP vendors should focus on revolutionising interface 
design and usability issues, bearing in mind the wider healthcare context in which such 
software is used. Healthcare organisations should draw upon human factors principles when 
implementing EP. Consideration of work environment, infrastructure, training, prescribing 
responsibilities and behaviours should be considered to address local issues identified.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Prescribing errors are a common source of preventable harm in hospitals worldwide.1 In the 
UK, prescribing errors occur in 7.5-14.7% of inpatient medication orders, harming an 
estimated 1-2%.2-6 Electronic prescribing (EP) is a potentially important intervention to reduce 
errors7-10 and its use strongly advocated.11,12 EP provides many potential benefits over 
handwritten medication orders, including completeness, standardisation, legibility, audit trails, 
and decision support.7-9,13 However, prescribing errors are not mitigated entirely; EP may 
contribute to new types of error not seen with paper.14-16 
Prescribing is a complex process involving consideration of the patient’s clinical condition, 
medical history, evidence base, medication availability, potential adverse effects and patient 
preference, followed by correct generation of the medication order.17 This multi-faceted 
process makes prescribing a common source of error.17,18 The application of human factors 
principles and a systems approach has become well established within healthcare;19,20,21 such 
concepts acknowledge the “complex interplay between people, tasks, technologies, 
organisations and environments”.22 In particular, Reason’s model of accident causation 
(appendix 1)23-25 has been used to explore the causes of prescribing errors.2,18,26-29 This model 
assumes that ‘latent conditions’ create an environment where ‘error-producing conditions’ are 
more likely to occur and thus cause ‘active failures’ at the front-line.23,27 Latent conditions are 
the management decisions, organisational processes and cultural issues that create risks 
within the system; error-producing conditions are specific factors associated with the patient, 
individual, team, task, technology or the environment that directly affect front-line operations. 
Since latent conditions are the precursor to error-producing conditions, it is important to 
identify and understand these to develop a proactive risk management strategy and develop 
effective interventions.23,30  
There is a wealth of information about causes of prescribing errors associated with paper-
based prescribing.2,18,26-29 Such studies have sourced perceptions of error causation from 
prescribers themselves, as it is argued that cause is “inextricably linked with knowing the 
intention of the person” involved.27 These studies suggest that causes are multifaceted and 
influenced by various error-producing and latent conditions.2,18,26-29 Other studies suggest that 
EP can give rise to new types of error, attributed to technology design, functionality and 
usability issues.14-16,31 A socio-technical approach has identified workflow and communication 
issues as contributory factors.14,15,32-34 A recent review provides valuable insights into 
prescribing error causation, focussing on issues associated with the EP system itself and 
user-EP interaction.31 However, there has been little work exploring causes of prescribing 
errors using models of human error in the context of EP. Such analysis would facilitate 
identification of latent conditions that influence errors in practice, leading to recommendations 
for targeted interventions.  
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Our objectives were to describe the causes of prescribing errors associated with EP from 
prescribers’ perspectives using Reason’s accident causation model, explore the associated 
latent conditions, and make recommendations to maximise benefits and minimise risks 
associated with inpatient EP.  
METHODS 
Design and setting 
We used an established qualitative approach to exploring prescribing error causality.18,26-28  
We studied all twenty-four medical and surgical wards in a 500 bed English teaching hospital 
that implemented a commercially available inpatient EP system in 2015. Six critical care and 
paediatric wards were excluded as they did not use EP. Prior to EP, prescribers hand-wrote 
medication orders on paper drug-charts. Using EP, prescribers accessed patient records 
using an access card and secure log-in on a desktop computer or computer-on-wheels 
(COW). Medication orders were generated from drop-down lists to select the required drug, 
dose, route and administration times. The available decision support comprised dosing 
regimen suggestions (“order-sentences”) for commonly used drugs, lists of multiple orders for 
particular situations (“order-sets”), patient-specific drug-allergy notifications, and reminder 
alerts for the timely assessment of thromboprophylaxis risk and medication review. 
Participant recruitment 
All pharmacists working on included wards were requested to report prescribing errors 
identified as part of their normal clinical duties to a research pharmacist; this did not replace 
the need to report through the organisation’s incident reporting system. The researcher 
electronically reviewed the medication order to identify the prescriber(s) involved and 
determine whether it met our definition a prescribing error (appendix 2).35 Prescribers who 
had generated incorrect medication orders were purposively sampled36 to maximise variation 
in error types, prescriber grades and clinical specialties. We categorised types of prescribing 
error based on a published taxonomy37; categories specific to EP were iteratively 
incorporated. Prescribers were contacted in person or by telephone within 96 hours of the 
error to aid recall,18 briefed about study objectives and invited to participate; alternatively an 
email sent inviting them to contact the researcher for further information.  
Data collection 
Face-to-face semi-structured interviews were conducted as soon as possible in hospital 
locations chosen by participants. Interviews were guided by an interview schedule (appendix 
3) developed from existing literature2,3,18,24,38 and piloted with one doctor beforehand. 
Questions for all participants focussed on the circumstances and causes surrounding the 
error and their experiences of the EP system; probes and clarification questions were added 
as necessary. Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim by a commercial 
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transcriber; one was transcribed by the researcher because confidential information was 
potentially audible in the background. Both researchers were pharmacists employed by the 
hospital organisation with clinical, medication safety, and qualitative research experience. The 
researcher conducting interviews was unknown to participants prior to the study.  
Data analysis  
Data were analysed thematically using NVivo software. Data relating to error causation were 
analysed deductively using a framework based on Reason’s accident causation model.23-25 
Data were mapped against the model’s categories of active failure (slip, lapse, rule-based 
mistake, knowledge-based mistake or violation) and error-producing conditions (patient, 
individual, team, environmental, task or technology factors); analysis and interpretation 
focussed on linking these to their underlying latent conditions (organisational culture, 
management strategy or external influences). We also considered whether error-producing 
conditions were specific to EP or applicable to both paper and EP. Interviews continued until 
the researcher judged that theoretical saturation had been reached.39 Coding of three 
interviews was checked by a second researcher; no disagreements were identified. In a 
separate process, both researchers categorised each active failure and any disagreements 
were resolved via discussion.   
Ethical considerations 
The study was approved locally; NHS ethics approval was not required. Lead clinicians were 
encouraged to inform members of their teams about the study. Participants provided written 
informed consent prior to interview. 
RESULTS 
Participants 
Pharmacists reported 193 prescribing errors by 122 prescribers during April to June 2016; 81 
prescribers were invited to participate (appendix 4). Twenty-five interviews exploring 32 errors 
were conducted. Participants comprised one nurse prescriber and 24 doctors: seven of 
foundation year 1 (FY1); three foundation year 2 (FY2); eight senior house officers (SHOs); 
four registrars and two consultants.40 Participants represented medical (n=11) and surgical 
(n=13) specialities. Interviews lasted from 8 to 35 minutes  
Types of prescribing errors and active failures 
There were 11 types of error explored during interviews (appendix 5); a primary active failure 
was identified for each error (table 1).  
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Table 1. Examples of the types of prescribing error explored during interviews and their active 
failure classification. Appendix 6 presents details of all errors explored during interviews. 
Type of active 
failure (n; of a 
total of 32) 
Examples of prescribing errors explored during interviews 
Type of 
prescribing error 
Brief description of prescribing error 
Slip (4) 
Incorrect dosage 
units 
150 tablets of irbesartan selected instead of 150mg. 
Incorrect drug 
Ceftriaxone selected instead of cefuroxime for gastro-
intestinal surgery prophylaxis. 
Lapse (1) 
 
Drug prescribed 
is not indicated 
for patient 
Doxycycline was intended to be stopped but was 
unintentionally continued. 
Knowledge-based 
mistake (1) 
Incorrect dose 
Pregabalin initiated at 75mg daily, however a reduced dose 
of 25mg daily was required due to severe renal impairment. 
The prescriber was aware they lacked knowledge to 
appropriately reduce the dose so consulted senior advice 
when prescribing. 
Rule-based 
mistake: 
Failure to apply a 
good rule (5) 
Incorrect dose 
Co-amoxiclav [amoxicillin and clavulanic acid] prescribed at 
1.2g three times a day however a reduced dose of twice a 
day was required due to renal impairment. The prescriber 
knew a dose reduction is required in renal impairment 
although failed to consider renal function when prescribing. 
Rule-based 
mistake: 
Misapplication of 
a good rule (5) 
 
Drug prescribed 
is not indicated 
for patient 
Trimethoprim prescribed for treatment of urinary tract 
infection, however was not suitable for the patient as their 
midstream urine sensitivity suggested resistance to 
trimethoprim. 
Failure to take 
into account drug 
interaction 
Ciprofloxacin prescribed for urinary tract infection without 
considering if there was an interaction with duloxetine which 
was already prescribed. 
Drug prescribed 
is contra-
indicated 
The adverse effect of tramadol lowering seizure threshold 
was not considered and prescribed for a patient with a brain 
injury and alcohol induced seizures. 
Rule-based 
mistake: 
Application of an 
inappropriate rule  
(14) 
Duplicated 
therapy 
Insulin (NovoMix30®) prescribed although was not required 
as the patient was already receiving insulin by variable rate 
intravenous infusion. 
Duplicated 
therapy 
The medication order for oral co-amoxiclav [amoxicillin and 
clavulanic acid] 625mg three times a day was duplicated 
Medication 
omitted when 
clinically indicated 
Abacavir was unintentionally not prescribed on admission to 
hospital because the prescriber was unaware that it was the 
patient’s usual medication. 
Prescribing on an 
invalid 
prescription 
All medications were ordered in an incorrect patient 
encounter referring to a patient’s previous admission, so the 
prescription was invalid and inactive.  
Incorrect dosing 
schedule 
Meropenem was switched to ertapenem, however the first 
dose of ertapenem was scheduled for the following day 
however was intended to be prescribed immediately. 
Violation  
(2) 
Incorrect route 
Oral (rather than intravenous) vancomycin was prescribed 
for hospital acquired pneumonia. The patient received the 
correct route in practice, however the electronic chart used 
for record purposes was incorrect and not updated. 
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Causes of prescribing errors 
Multiple error-producing conditions were described; their perceived association with EP is 
presented in table 2. There were three broad groups of latent conditions: 1) EP system 
functionality and design; 2) organisational decisions around EP implementation and use, and 
3) prescribing behaviours in the context of EP; the results relating to each of these are next 
described in turn, highlighting the influence of latent conditions on subsequent error-producing 
conditions and active failures. Quotations are illustrative of key themes and findings.  
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Table 2:  Error-producing conditions reported as contributory factors to prescribing errors 
Category of 
error-
producing 
conditions  
Error-producing conditions applicable 
to both electronic and paper-
prescribing 
Error-producing conditions 
specifically associated with electronic 
prescribing (EP) 
Patient 
factors 
 Complex patient 
 Patient perceived to be unreliable 
information source 
 
Individual 
factors 
 Lack of specific drug knowledge 
 Unaware of lack of knowledge 
 Unaware of own errors 
 Inappropriate self-check process  
 Impaired physical or mental well-
being  
 Lack of skills using EP system 
 Perception that prescribing on EP is 
simple and low-risk 
 Perception that electronic 
documentation is less important than 
clinical appropriateness 
 Variable training using EP system  
Team  
factors 
 Junior staff have main prescribing 
role 
 Prescribers receive incorrect or 
incomplete advice  
 Lack of supervision and support 
 Expanding prescribing roles to non-
medical staff can result in deskilled 
doctors 
 Poor communication within large 
teams  
 Poor communication between 
multiple teams 
 Prescribers do not receive feedback 
about errors  
 Over-reliance on others to correct 
errors 
 Senior doctors have limited practical 
knowledge using EP 
Work 
environment 
 High workload and time pressures 
 Busy ward rounds and on-call shifts 
 Interruptions and distractions 
 Limited availability of portable 
computers 
 Higher workload for individual 
operating the computer 
 Portable computers considered too 
cumbersome 
 Prescribing remotely without 
observing patient 
Task  
factors 
 Prescribing has low priority 
 Lack of written resources available 
 Misinterpreting prescribing guidelines 
 Patient information not sought 
 Pharmacist advice not sought 
 Information is fragmented 
 Hybrid paper and electronic systems  
 Over-reliance on order-sentences 
Technology 
factors 
 
 
 Complex prescribing functions within 
EP 
 Unfamiliar terminology 
 Inappropriate default settings 
 Problems interpreting information 
 Difficulty accessing information 
 Long drop-down lists 
 Unhelpful alerts 
 Slow log-in process 
 Lack of clinical decision support 
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1. EP system functionality and design  
Prescribing functions and usability 
All participants identified that design, usability and functionality issues can negatively 
influence safety. While interviewees recognised the system’s inherent limitations, they 
believed that local informatics teams should be able to resolve certain problems. 
Some commonly used medications were perceived as disproportionately complex to 
prescribe using EP; these included medications that require variable dosing such as warfarin, 
courses of fixed duration, and once-only doses. Furthermore, problems arose when precise 
terminology was required to order medication; doctors considered the requirement to specify 
certain dose units or additives to be outside of their remit. 
“Doctors are very familiar with prescribing potassium in amounts of 
millimoles rather than in percentages of a solution […] [and] really struggle 
with that. (Interview 22, SHO) 
“I probably spent about an hour working out how to prescribe a syringe 
driver […] it was asking me about the additives. I was like this is not 
something you do as a doctor, nurses just know what to add.” (Interview 11, 
FY2)  
The EP system listed only approved generic medication names as per hospital policy. This 
was perceived as unhelpful when searching for medications with a commonly used alternative 
name, such as “vitamin K” for phytomenadione. Two interviewees described prescribing 
alternative treatments if the first choice could not be located. 
 “…I wanted to write up a plain bupivacaine epidural infusion. I couldn’t find it 
[…] I don’t want to give the guy some fentanyl in his bupivacaine, but I could 
only find fentanyl one. So I had to stop his systemic opioids and just put him 
on the fentanyl.” (Interview 4, Consultant) 
Ordering incorrect drugs or dosage units was associated with slips using keystrokes or 
selection errors from drop-down lists, sometimes considered too long or in an unintuitive 
sequence.  
“Why do you have to scroll through 100 words beginning with ‘I’ when IV 
[intravenous] surely is more common than intrathecal” (Interview 14, SHO) 
Interface design 
Participants felt that medication-related interfaces were inadequately designed and difficult to 
interpret. The default view for ordering medications caused confusion as medications 
appeared among orders for blood or scan requests, in what was perceived to be a 
nonsensical order. Additionally, it was felt that essential information was hidden or fragmented 
due to overcrowded screens or multiple tabs that were inaccessible simultaneously.  
9 
 
“…it’s basically just too much writing on all of the screens, so then you 
generally pay attention to nothing as opposed to actually seeing anything 
useful.” (Interview 20, SHO)  
“…so within the boxes where the medicines are prescribed, you often have 
to hover over it with a cursor to see the full prescription, and important parts 
of the prescription can be ignored as a result.” (Interview 12, Consultant) 
Interpreting previously administered medications was considered particularly challenging 
because a limited number of drugs were displayed at a time. Respondents reported missing 
important information such as dose omissions or when medication had been stopped. 
“It’s not the easiest interface to use. You have to scroll across, across, 
across […] And then if they’ve a long prescription you have to go all the way 
up and all the way down. It would be easier to have a zoom out tool.” 
(Interview 24, Registrar) 
Consequently, respondents admitted not checking some prescriptions at all, with duplications 
attributed to failing to check the medication already prescribed.  
 “…when you had a paper chart you would just open it up and quickly flick 
through and have a look at the drugs, and I don’t think we do that as 
routinely now that we have an electronic chart […] I think we’re all very used 
to a very visual drug chart, and [the EP system] doesn’t provide that same 
experience.” (Interview 15, FY2) 
2. Organisational decisions around EP implementation and use  
Paper and electronic hybrid environment 
Within certain clinical areas, including haemodialysis and emergency units, paper-prescribing 
was still used. Errors occurred due to confusion caused by the hybrid environment.  
“…for acute trauma admission we have […] a paper drug chart. And 
frequently we’ll put the first dose of phenytoin, which is a loading dose onto 
that. And so you have to go and find that to check if they’ve had the loading 
dose. So sometimes there is confusion related to that first dose as to 
whether it’s been prescribed on [EP system] or on there.” (Interview 1, SHO) 
EP system training 
Respondents expressed varying levels of confidence and competence using EP. Errors were 
associated with inability to fully utilise the system, such as not retrieving weight information, or 
being unable to amend dose frequencies. While some respondents were aware of their 
knowledge gaps, others erroneously believed certain functions were unsupported by EP. One 
explanation may be ineffective training; one doctor reported receiving no training at all.  
“…you were either physically available and free to have training or you never 
got trained, and you showed up on the day and then there were no more 
[paper] drug charts.” (Interview 13, FY1) 
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In contrast, a participant who was trained as part of the initial EP pilot received intense ward-
based training which was not replicated to the same extent during roll-out, suggesting this 
may be more effective.  
“…I got taught how to know which medications have been given and when a 
stop date was and all these sorts of things. I think lots of people haven’t 
been taught, so there’s still lots of doctors who will look at it and go, “I’ve got 
no idea if this drug’s been given or not.”” (Interview 21, FY1) 
Prescribing environment and infrastructure  
On ward-rounds where only one COW was used, a heavy workload fell to one individual; 
multiple COWs were sometimes used to circumvent this. However, in certain clinical areas 
respondents reported limited or no available COWs. Slow log-in processes were frequently 
cited as inadequate to support EP and an additional distraction that could lead to slips and 
lapses. One doctor admitted prescribing using colleagues’ accounts instead of switching the 
user to overcome this. 
“And having to find a computer, log onto [EP system] and prescribe it is a bit 
of a pain, mostly because Trust [NHS organisation] computers are Trust 
computers. They can take forever, and the [EP] system can be really 
temperamental at times which can be a real pain….” (Interview 7, SHO) 
Respondents suggested that prescribing away from the patient was required when there were 
insufficient COWs, sometimes perceived as contributing to errors:  
“…I prescribed some penicillin… the nurse who was standing with me said 
“oh I’ll put that up straight away”. […] And I had to walk right to the other end 
of A and E [accident and emergency] which was where my [EP log-in] card 
was […] When I got there I typed in penicillin, it flashed up allergy. At which 
point I sprinted back down to the patient. She was already having it […] And 
in fact she didn’t have a penicillin allergy […] But it was a real lesson in 
making sure it’s actually been prescribed in front [of the patient].” (Interview 
14, SHO) 
Even where COWs were available, some respondents preferred not to use them because 
they were too cumbersome.  
“… on the postnatal ward, it’s an old ward and there’s not much space. 
There’s cots, there’s relatives, and it’s just cumbersome to take [the COW] 
round between the beds.” (Interview 15, SHO)  
One doctor also felt that using the COW created a barrier between them and the patient; this 
led them to prescribe retrospectively rather than during the consultation, which could lead to 
tasks being forgotten. Additionally, while prescribing without visiting the ward improved 
efficiency, some felt it should be discouraged due to the potential for errors. 
“…the idea that you can prescribe for somebody without being 
geographically close to them, i.e. having not laid eyes on them, I think will 
eventually lead to something going wrong or amiss […] you’re depending on 
someone else’s maybe less experienced assessment and some numbers 
rather than your own clinical acumen.” (Interview 20, SHO) 
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3. Prescribing behaviours in the context of EP Expectations of decision support 
Prescribers had positive views of the available decision support. In particular, allergy alerts, 
order-sentences and order-sets were considered to improve safety and efficiency. However, 
over-reliance resulted in rule-based mistakes when order-sentences or order-sets were not 
tailored for the patient.  
 “There’s an anaesthetic care-set… and up comes all the things we 
anaesthetists like... And basically I just zip down there, tick, tick, tick, all the 
things I feel [the patient needs]. […]  I did this again last week actually, and I 
looked at the chart [and thought] “Oh my goodness this guy’s on two 
paracetamols”.” (Interview 4, Consultant) 
It was recognised that misplaced trust in decision support consequently influenced how 
prescribers sought guidance.                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
“…[EP order-sentences] might make us not use the BNF [British National 
Formulary] as much as we should, or speak to a pharmacist as much as we 
should, because we think we can see it so therefore that must be the dose.” 
(Interview 1, SHO) 
Respondents also cited lack of safety features as contributing to errors. There was an 
overwhelming expectation that EP should prevent duplications, prompt for correct timings of 
antibiotics, and intercept obvious incorrect doses. Such views were influenced by previous 
experience or preconceived expectations of EP. Interestingly, two respondents described 
safety features that were not supported by the system such as drug-drug interactions. 
“…[EP] shows much better interactions, if there [are] like two different 
medications that have interactions, which you might not realise […] I think 
that’s a very good thing in the system.” (Interview 2, Registrar)  
Despite the desire for more decision support, certain alerts were perceived as an unhelpful 
distraction, especially if out-of-sync with workflow or not relevant. In particular, the venous 
thromboembolism risk assessment alert was perceived to be inconveniently placed and 
designed for auditing rather than improving prescribing. 
Respondents reasoned that such features should be well-designed and represent imminent 
safety risks. It was also apparent that certain in-built safety features were ineffective, for 
example when ‘tall-man lettering’ to help differentiate cephalosporins went unnoticed.  
Prescribing roles and responsibilities 
It was widely acknowledged that junior doctors mostly prescribed on instruction from their 
seniors; it was suggested that EP further emphasises this dynamic. On ward rounds, juniors 
would be logged into the system to enter notes, and manoeuvre the COW. By default they 
were therefore responsible for prescribing and seniors perceived them to be more skilled with 
EP. Errors occurred when instructions from seniors were incomplete and where seniors 
lacked awareness of EP limitations such as slow-log-in times or the need to manually specify 
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antibiotic start-times. Although juniors prescribed, they also expected their seniors to oversee 
and review medication. A concern was that this now happened less often due to unfamiliarity 
with EP.  
 “…you want your consultant to be able to have a quick glance and pick up 
anything quickly. Whereas I think it’s more difficult for them to do it on this 
system. So they’re like relying on us to do the glancing, when I don’t feel like 
I can… Some of the consultants… love [EP system] and can use it really 
quickly. But lots of them can’t.” (Interview 11, FY2) 
Prescribing attitudes and culture  
It was apparent that EP had influenced individuals’ prescribing attitudes and behaviours. Most 
expressed a positive view of EP in relation to safety, while acknowledging its limitations.  
Additionally, some suggested improved attitudes because of the robust audit trail.  
 “…people’s attitudes are a bit better as well, because, you know, you’ve got 
your name there, like your whole name there in black and white […] So it 
probably makes people more accountable ....” (Interview 10, FY1) 
Conversely, three participants had an overall negative view and reduced confidence in EP. 
“With the more complex medicines that occasionally get used here, I do find 
myself double and triple-checking more than I would with the paper charts.” 
(Interview 22, SHO) 
Views around prescribing being of low importance were frequently expressed. Participants 
described prescribing having little priority in medical education, influenced by prescribers 
increasingly relying on protocols and now decision support embedded within EP. Where a 
complex patient or a prescriber’s lack of knowledge contributed to an error, participants 
strongly expressed a need for more intelligent decision support. Conversely, others feared 
advanced technology would de-skill prescribers and advocated improving education and 
feedback; most prescribers were unaware of their error prior to being invited to participate in 
the study.  
DISCUSSION 
Key findings 
Prescribing errors in the context of EP largely stemmed from three groups of latent conditions: 
functionality and design of the EP system, organisational decisions around implementation, 
and prescribing behaviours, suggesting that these may be areas for intervention. Use of EP 
was specifically linked to error-producing conditions at the level of individual, team, task, 
environment and technology. Active failure types included slips due to incorrect selection from 
drop-down lists and rule-based mistakes due to over-reliance on default prescribing 
suggestions or failing to check for duplicated orders. Using order-sentences and order-sets 
has potentially encouraged rule-driven prescribing practices that may have contributed to the 
rule-based mistakes observed.   
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The application of Reason’s accident causation model also revealed how EP has influenced 
prescribing practices. Shifts in prescribing responsibilities, changes to individuals’ prescribing 
behaviours and learning needs, and the altered physical prescribing environment were 
described as contributing to error. While EP can improve safety,7-10 our findings add to 
previous literature highlighting that the success of such technology depends on its design and 
usability,41 as well as its integration within the wider system.42,43 While some findings resonate 
with existing literature exploring error causation in paper-based settings,2,18,26-29 other 
contributory factors were unique to EP, suggesting some important differences in error 
aetiology that must be considered in strategies to improve prescribing safety. 
Recommendations to improve prescribing safety  
 
EP industry  
Although participants identified aspects of improved efficiency compared to paper,34 they 
were apparently reluctant to spend extra time addressing inconveniences, such as 
interpreting confusing interfaces. Such frustrations may introduce a distraction leading to 
attentional failures,44 or encourage workarounds, unsafe practices, and negative feelings.32 
Complex prescribing functions and poorly designed interfaces have also been reported 
previously.14-16,31,32,45,46 There is an urgent need for EP software designers to revolutionise 
interface design and address usability issues to meet demands of front-line prescribers 
working in high-pressured environments. Performing certain tasks should be simplified; 
designers should carefully consider and where possible incorporate the affordances of paper-
prescribing,47 understanding its more nuanced functions.14 A particular example highlighted in 
the present study was the tangibility of gaining a quick, overall view of prescribed medications 
with a paper drug-chart; a function not afforded by the electronic equivalent.   
Local informatics teams 
Local teams should consider providing local solutions to usability problems. Alert fatigue can 
be reduced by minimising non-essential and untimely alerts. Nevertheless, users expect a 
certain level of sophistication from EP to enhance safety, namely the prevention of obvious 
errors and the ability to use common drug nomenclature. Additionally, shorter lists have been 
advocated to reduce slips due to incorrect selection from drop-down menus.31,48  
Hospital organisations 
Hospital organisations must ensure their infrastructure supports prescribing at the bedside 
and discourage prescribing away from the patient.49 Availability of multiple COWs during ward 
rounds may encourage better workload distribution among team members. Organisations 
should aim to minimise periods of hybrid paper and electronic systems during implementation; 
the suitability of EP for specialist areas is crucial to achieve this.  
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The finding that doctors may review medications less frequently on EP compared to paper-
prescribing has previously been reported.32 Interviewees also reported senior doctors 
avoiding medication review altogether because they lacked confidence with EP. 
Organisations should clarify expectations regarding medication review; a balance between 
improving efficiency and discouraging risky prescribing behaviours is required. 
Education and training strategies 
There has been a drive to increase prescribing education in recent years.2,26,50,51 Future 
educational strategies should specifically consider how to best prepare prescribers to use 
EP.52 The present study also suggests the importance of raising awareness of EP’s limitations 
and the risks of over-reliance, and addressing new learning needs precipitated  by EP such 
as selecting syringe driver diluents. 
Strengths and limitations 
The main strength was that our qualitative approach allowed elucidation of prescribers’ 
perspectives of specific errors. The sampling strategy was robust in that errors were identified 
by pharmacists, encouraging a more objective discussion compared to exploring self-reported 
errors or general perceptions alone.2,31 This approach allowed exploration of varying error 
types, including errors that prescribers were previously unaware of.53 The explicit application 
of a theoretical model allowed for elucidation of underlying latent conditions to target for 
intervention, such as responsibilities, behaviours, attitudes and culture. Additionally, 
similarities between our findings and other research using different methods31,54 support 
cumulative validity of the findings.   
Limitations are that we included perceptions of a sample of prescribers within one hospital 
using one EP system; nevertheless, it is likely that commonality will exist in similar 
organisations. It is possible that participants provided socially desirable responses, were 
subject to recall bias, or were limited by their own perceptions and awareness as front-line 
clinicians. Member checking was not conducted but interviews were transcribed verbatim thus 
minimising scope for selective interpretation. Although theoretical saturation was reached, the 
sample of 25 interviews was smaller than in similar studies of paper-based prescribing,18,26 
and not all error types could be explored. Similarly, non-medical prescribers were under-
represented. 
Future work should aim to understand causes of a wider range of error types, in multiple 
organisations using different EP software. Triangulation of data with a robust quantitative 
study to determine prevalence of prescribing error types would add further validity to this 
research area. Issues affecting non-medical prescribers should be further explored due to 
considerable differences in their training and prescribing roles.  
CONCLUSIONS 
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Prescribing errors were associated with latent conditions associated with functionality and 
design of the EP system, organisational decisions around implementation, and prescribing 
behaviours using EP. Application of a theory-based qualitative approach allowed elucidation 
of new findings about error aetiology in the context of EP; these included shifts in prescribing 
responsibilities, changes to individuals’ prescribing behaviours and learning needs, and the 
altered physical prescribing environment.  
The EP industry should focus on revolutionising interface design and usability issues, bearing 
in mind the wider healthcare context in which such software is used. Healthcare organisations 
should draw upon human factors principles when implementing EP to improve safety. 
Consideration of local environments, infrastructure and training should be considered to 
address local issues identified.   
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